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Abstract
A model of collective action in the commons that is intended to provide a framework
for empirical research into the question of when cooperation is likely to be successful is
presented. It is based on the presence of costly punishment opportunities, some players
who have a taste for punishing those who violate agreements to cooperate (an assump-
tion strongly supported by recent experimental research), and bounded rationality. It
predicts that cooperation is more likely when communication is cheap, the technology
of public good provision is suﬃciently productive, eﬀective punishment opportunities
are available at suﬃciently low cost, and when group size is large (holding constant
the other parameters mentioned). Heterogeneity in the ability to inﬂict punishment or
be hurt by it may result in collective action becoming infeasible, especially when there
are increasing returns to the public good, but there is a range of parameters in which
changes in heterogeneity will have no eﬀect and circumstances in which heterogeneity
will actually favor cooperation.
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This paper outlines a theory of collective action in common property resource use that is
intended to predict the circumstances under which such action will be successful. There is
now a very large empirical literature on common property resource use, mostly case studies
as well as some econometric studies. However, to the best of our knowledge there is no
internally consistent model that broadly conforms to the facts that have emerged from the
case study literature and that presents comparative static results on when collective action is
likely to be successful. The theory outlined here is intended to ﬁll this gap and is presented in
the hope that it will be of use to empirical researchers studying common property resource
use who may adapt it to ﬁt their problem. It is based on the idea that at least some
individuals involved in extraction decisions are not motivated exclusively by material self-
interest. Speciﬁcally, we allow for the possibility that a concern for reciprocity may be an
important consideration in such environments.
Economic analyses of common property typically proceed under the hypothesis that ex-
tractors make independent choices with a view to maximizing their material well-being. Since
each individual neglects the implications of their decisions on the payoﬀs of other extractors,
this results in suboptimal extraction levels from the perspective of the group as a whole.
This eﬀect is clearly illustrated in the following simple, static model of the commons, based
on the work of Gordon (1954) and Dasgupta and Heal (1979). Consider a group of indi-
viduals with shared access to a resource which is valuable but costly to appropriate. Each
appropriator makes an independent choice regarding his level of resource extraction. The
aggregate amount of extraction is simply the sum of all individual extraction levels. The
total cost of extraction incurred by the group as a whole rises with aggregate extraction in
accordance with the following hypothesis: the higher the level of aggregate extraction, the
more it costs to extract an additional unit of the resource. Think of a ﬁshery. The more
nets there are in the water, the fewer the ﬁsh that will be caught in each net. That is, the
more nets it will take to catch a given amount of ﬁsh. The cost of catching a ﬁsh rises as
the total eﬀort devoted to ﬁshing rises. The share of the totalc o s to fe x t r a c t i o nt h a ti sp a i d
by any given appropriator is equal to the share of this appropriator’s extraction in the total
extraction by the group. In other words, costs are proportional to harvests. These assump-
tions imply that an increase in extraction by one appropriator raises the cost of extraction
for all appropriators.
Figure 1 depicts the manner in which aggregate beneﬁts and costs vary with the level
of aggregate extraction. The straight line corresponds to the monetary value of aggregate
2extraction and the curve to the aggregate costs of extraction. The costs rise gradually at
ﬁrst and then rapidly, so that there is a unique level of aggregate extraction X∗ at which net
beneﬁts are maximized. If each appropriator were to extract an equal share of this amount,
the resulting outcome would be optimal from the perspective of the group. However, if all
appropriators were to choose this level of extraction, self-interested individuals would prefer
to extract more since this would increase their own private payoﬀs .R e t u r n i n gt ot h eﬁshery
example, at X∗ an additional net in the water would catch enough ﬁsh to more than justify
its private cost, but it would lower the catch in all the other nets by enough that the resulting
change in total proﬁts would be negative. However, since some of the other nets are owned
by other individuals, it would still be privately proﬁtable to use the additional net. The fact
that this increase in proﬁtw o u l dc o m ea tt h ec o s to fl o w e r i n gt h ec o m b i n e dp a y o ﬀ to the



































Figure 1. Aggregate Costs and Beneﬁts of Extraction.
3If all appropriators were self-interested, and made independent choices regarding their
extraction levels, the resulting level of aggregate extraction would not be optimal from the
perspective of the group. It is possible to show that in a Nash equilibrium of the game played
by a group of self-interested appropriators, each one would choose the same extraction level
and that the resulting aggregate extraction Xe would exceed X∗ (as shown in Figure 1).
The level of extraction under such decentralized, self-interested choice is ineﬃcient:e a c h
member of the group could obtain higher payoﬀs if all were forced to limit their extraction.
This model allows one to examine how variables of interest like total extraction and
total proﬁts change as various parameters change. For example, an increase in the sale
price of the harvested resource would be represented by an increase in the slope of the line
representing beneﬁts in Figure 1. This would increase X∗ and Xe.A ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e r
of appropriators would not change X∗ but would lead to an increase in Xe a n dt oad e c l i n e
in total proﬁts. Many more realistic features can be added to the model. However, the static
model suﬀers from one basic problem. It does not explain why the “tragedy of the commons”
is avoided in some cases but not in others. In the model, the tragedy is inexorable. It may
be better or worse, but it is inescapable. Other static models of the commons, for example,
Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov (forthcoming), or those surveyed in Baland and Platteau
(forthcoming) derive diﬀering degrees of cooperation depending on the degree of inequality
in various dimensions as well as other factors. It remains true, however, that ineﬃciency is
the general rule.
To explain why cooperation is possible and eﬃciency (approximately) attainable, time
is incorporated into the model. The orthodox way to do this is to suppose that there is a
future of inﬁnitely many periods. In each period, the players play the game above. However,
they no longer maximize current payoﬀs. Rather, they maximize a discounted sum of payoﬀs
from the current and all future periods. The rationale is that for a variety of reasons, the
future matters less than the current period, because of impatience, because interest can be
earned on resources converted into cash, because of uncertainty that there will be a resource
to exploit in the future, and so forth. Now players take as given, not just each others’ actions
in the current period, but also the plans made by others for the inﬁnite future. Each player’s
plan tells him what to do in each period in response to the entire history of play upto that
point. The introduction of the future allows players to punish the other players for excessive
exploitation by increasing their own future exploitation. The awareness that other players
have such a contingent plan then deters players from harvesting more than their share of the
eﬃcient amount. An equilibrium with eﬃcient extraction levels now exists, provided that
4players do not discount future payoﬀs too much. Moreover, such an equilibrium need not
be based on “incredible” threats of punishment: threats which individuals would not ﬁnd in
their interest to carry out if called upon to do so. In other words, there can exist an eﬃcient
equilibrium that satisﬁes the property of subgame perfection.
One diﬃculty with this modeling approach is that the subgame-perfect equilibrium de-
scribed above is only one of inﬁnitely many equilibria that exhibit diﬀerent degrees of resource
exploitation. For example, suppose everyone adopts the following strategy: they extract an
nth share of Xe in every period no matter what anyone else does. It follows immediately
that no single player can gain by deviating unilaterally from his plan at any stage. This is
also a subgame-perfect equilibrium, one in which the tragedy occurs in full force. Among
other possible equilibria, some are quite outlandish. For example, it is an equilibrium for
players to extract an nth share of Xe in every third period, while exercising restraint in
other periods unless someone deviates from this rule, in which case everyone switches to the
non-cooperative behavior in every period.
Since diﬀerent equilibria will change in diﬀerent ways in response to changes in underlying
parameters, the multiplicity of equilibria poses a problem for the exercise of comparative
statics. As a result, comparative statics is sometimes performed on the set of equilibria or by
focusing on a chosen equilibrium, usually the best attainable for all players, as, for example, in
Bendor and Mookherjee (1987). Unfortunately, the equilibrium set often contains equilibria
whose outcomes are very diﬀerent from each other, while focusing on the best attainable
equilibrium requires further justiﬁcation. We will provide such a justiﬁcation in the model
below, although it is not in the repeated-game framework.
Another problem with the repeated-game approach to explaining cooperation is that it
is not robust to noise, for example, in the form of mistakes or experimentation by boundedly
rational players. As long as such noise is not negligible, ‘trigger strategies’ of the kind
described above will lead to frequent breakdowns and restarts of cooperation (Kreps, 1990).
So far as we are aware, this kind of pattern has not been reported in the empirical literature
on common pool resources. In fact, if it is costly to start cooperating following a non-
cooperative phase, as is likely in many situations, this explains why attempts to cooperate
on the basis of such strategies are not observed.
Economists often interpret equilibria in which exploitation is restrained by repeated-game
strategies as “social norms”. This interpretation appears somewhat strained. Social norms
do not usually take the form of each person implicitly telling the others that if any of them
does not conform to the norm, then neither will he. In addition, this model does away with
5the need for governance. In fact, as the vast empirical literature on the commons has shown,
successful commons management often or even usually has some institutions to support it
(Ostrom 1990). These involve rules or norms, with ﬁnes or other punishments speciﬁed, often
explicitly, for violations. If the shadow of the future were all that were needed to sustain
cooperation, such institutions have no reason to exist.
One alternative to the standard model is to allow for departures from explicitly opti-
mizing behavior in favor of an evolutionary approach. In Sethi and Somanathan (1996), we
postulated that the proportion of players playing diﬀerent (possibly sub-optimal) strategies
would evolve over time under pressure of diﬀerential payoﬀs, with more highly rewarded
strategies displacing less highly rewarded ones in the population. A critically important
assumption was that social punishments of some sort were available: players, at some cost to
themselves, could punish other players who did not exercise restraint in harvesting. Under
these circumstances, it was shown that a norm of restraint and punishment can be stable
under the evolutionary dynamics. Such norms can be destabilized, however, by parameter
changes that make harvesting more lucrative, such as increases in the market price of the
resource, or improvements in harvesting technology.
W h i l et h i sm o d e lg i v e sab e t t e rﬁt to the facts of cooperation in the commons, and allows
for some interesting comparative statics, a number of shortcomings remain. Individualistic
unrestrained exploitation is always stable, even if the parameters are such that a norm of
restraint would also be stable. Hence there is still some indeterminacy, although less than
in the standard model. The model exhibits persistence, but perhaps too much compared to
what is observed in the ﬁeld. And it is silent as to how a norm of restraint might evolve in
the ﬁrst place.
In the next section, we outline a new model that attempts to address these problems.
It seeks to fully specify the circumstances under which cooperation will be observed, and
departs from orthodox economic modeling in two ways. First, it assumes a simple form of
bounded rationality: myopia combined with static expectations. It will turn out that these
expectations will be consistent with the actual outcomes after convergence to equilibrium,
but not during the transition. The assumption of myopia rules out elaborate contingent
strategies. Second, it relies on the presence of individuals who do not respond only to material
payoﬀs. Economists have traditionally been reluctant to assume that people behave in ways
that are not self-interested. The reason for this is that once such assumptions are allowed
in the explanation of behavior, it becomes possible to explain virtually anything, but the
explanations will often be vacuous since they end up assuming what they purport to explain.
6In the last few years, however, a new way of disciplining the behavioral assumptions made
in modeling has become available, the combination of evolutionary theory and experimental
work.
The relevant departure from the characterization of people as being motivated solely by
self-interest, is the idea of reciprocity. Both gratitude and indignation are emotions that
are felt in connection with reciprocity, the former being associated with what we may call
‘positive’ reciprocity and the latter with ‘negative’ reciprocity. Experiments with human
subjects in the last few years have ﬁrmly established that many people display reciprocity
that is not motivated by the prospect of future gains. Most relevant to us is the work that
has been done with public goods games with punishment opportunities (surveyed in Fehr
and Gächter, 2000). In these games, subjects play a game in which a group of players
each choose how much to contribute to a public good. The experimenter sets the payoﬀs
so that contribution is privately costly but socially beneﬁcial. After each round, players
learn how much each of the other players contributed. Usually the others are identiﬁed
only by numbers, so players never ﬁnd out what another person actually played. Players
then have the opportunity to punish other players by lowering their payoﬀsa ts o m ec o s t
to themselves. It is found that even in the last round of such games, when players know
there will be no further interaction, some players punish others and do so at considerable
payoﬀ costs to themselves. Moreover, the presence of punishment opportunities increases
contributions substantially. There have been many experiments by several researchers with
variations on this theme in the last few years and they all display these features.1
A natural question that one may ask is: why do players behave in this way? Why should
preferences for reciprocity have evolved, when it may be costly to indulge such preferences?
Sethi and Somanathan (2003) discuss a number of mathematical models of how such evolu-
tion could have occurred. Essentially, these involve some combination of repetition, commit-
ment, assortation, and parochialism. Here we mention only the basic idea behind the models
that use parochialism. This is that people with preferences for reciprocity behave recipro-
cally with each other and selﬁshly when they meet people with selﬁsh preferences. As long
as people with selﬁsh preferences cannot perfectly mimic those with reciprocal preferences,
those with reciprocal preferences can get higher payoﬀs from cooperating with others like
them, and this can more than outweigh their losses when they are fooled by selﬁsh people
1In addition to the considerable body of work surveyed by Fehr and Gächter (2000), subsequent papers
include Bowles, Carpenter and Gintis (2001), Bochet, Page and Putterman (2002), Carpenter and Matthews
(2002), Fehr and Gächter (2002), Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2003), Page, Putterman and Unel
(2003) and Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2002).
7pretending to be reciprocators.
In fact, there is a good deal of evidence that people are heterogeneous. Some behave
opportunistically, cooperating with others when it pays to do so, and exploiting others
when that is the most privately proﬁtable strategy. Others are reciprocal, or sometimes even
unconditionally altruistic. This heterogeneity is also predicted by many evolutionary models.
In what follows, we take it as given that some people are ‘reciprocators’, while others are
opportunists, and explore the implications for the commons of the interaction between these
two preference types.
2 The Model
There are n players, i =1 ,2,...,n, each of whom has access to a common pool resource.
We suppose that some mechanism to monitor resource extraction from the common pool,
make rules if necessary, and levy ﬁnes has been set up at some cost. This has, however,
to be ﬁnanced by on-going contributions which are observable and voluntary. A failure to
contribute may result in punishment, but punishment is costly to impose and the decision
to punish is itself voluntary.
For the time being, let us suppose that all players are identically situated in all respects
(this assumption will be relaxed to allow for heterogeneity later). Player i can choose whether
to contribute to the public good (xi =1 )o rn o t( xi =0 ). The aggregate contribution is
denoted X ≡
Pn
j=1 xj. This aggregate contribution results in an aggregate beneﬁto fαX,
which is shared equally among all players (regardless of their contribution levels). Hence the
net beneﬁt to player i arising from any vector (x1,...,x n) o fc o n t r i b u t i o n si ss i m p l yαX/n−xi.
It is assumed that
α
n
< 1 <α , (1)
as is standard in public goods environments. Hence in the absence of punishment, it is
individually rational for opportunists to choose not to contribute, although it is eﬃcient for
all to contribute.
After contributions have been observed by everyone, each player i can choose whether or
not to participate in the (collective) punishment of all players j with xj =0 .I fi punishes,
then yi =1 ,a n di fi does not punish, then yi =0 . The total number of punishers (or
enforcers) is therefore e =
Pn
j=1 yj and, provided that at least one person punishes, the
total number of punished individuals is equal to the number of defectors d =
Pn
j=1 (1 − xj).
Each player who is punished suﬀers a ﬁxed penalty p (regardless of the number of players
8participating in punishment). Finally, the cost of punishing is proportional to the number
of defectors d, and inversely proportional to the number of enforcers e, with the parameter




nαX − xi if e =0 ,
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where x =( x1,...,xn) and y =( y1,...,yn) are the vectors of contributions and punishments
respectively. The ﬁrst term is i’s share of the output αX from the public good. The second
term is i’s contribution, the third the punishment p (non-zero only if i did not contribute),
and the fourth the cost to i of punishing (non-zero only if yi =1 ). This game is played every
period and it is assumed that players are myopic: they look only at the eﬀect of their actions
on current-period payoﬀs. While this assumption is somewhat extreme, it makes the game
simple and tractable, and is more plausible than the standard hypothesis that players can
w o r ko u ta l lt h ef u t u r ec o n s e q u e n c e so ft h e i ra c t i o n sa n dt h o s eo fo t h e r s .
We assume that there are two kinds of players, opportunists and reciprocators. There are
0 ≤ k ≤ n reciprocators. Opportunists maximize their material payoﬀs, and reciprocators
maximize utility ui(x,y)=πi(x,y)+bxiyi. Reciprocators therefore get a utility bonus b if they
have contributed and punished non-contributors. We may interpret this as the psychological
satisfaction they get from relieving their feelings of anger at non-contributors. Note that
reciprocators get no psychological satisfaction from punishing if they are themselves non-
contributors, or from having contributed if they do not punish.
Let O ⊂ {1,...,n} denote the set of opportunists (material payoﬀ maximizers) and R ⊂
{1,...,n} the set of reciprocators. Myopia ensures that opportunists will never punish, and
so yi =0for all i ∈ O. On the other hand, if a reciprocator punishes, then he must have
contributed. That is, for any i ∈ R, if yi =1then xi =1 .
A strategy or plan for player i is of the form (xi,y i(x)) where yi(x) is an indicator
function of the vector of contributions x.F o ro p p o r t u n i s t s ,yi(x) is the zero function. We
examine the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the game in every period. There
are two reasons for this choice. The ﬁr s ti st h a tp l a y e r sp l a y i n gi nac o n t e x tt h a ti sf a m i l i a r
are probably quite good at doing the necessary backward induction. Cosmides and Tooby
(1992) present evidence that people are quite good at solving logical tasks in a social context
that is familiar while being quite bad at solving logically equivalent problems presented in
an unfamiliar context. Second, the best-response dynamics we use below converge rapidly
to the subgame-perfect equilibria. We have the following three types of equilibria:
9i ∈ O i ∈ R
A Defect Defect
B Defect Contribute & punish
C Contribute Contribute, punish if one person defects
In equilibria of type A, there is neither contribution nor punishment. In type B equilibria,
opportunists do not contribute, while reciprocators contribute and punish. Finally in type
C equilibria, all individuals contribute and reciprocators punish any single individual who
deviates from the equilibrium by defecting.2
If k =0 , then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is of type A.I f1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, on
the other hand, multiple equilibria may exist. Subgame-perfect equilibria of type A with no




≥ b − γ(n − 1), (3)
that is, if the net payoﬀ a reciprocator gets from not contributing is greater than or equal to
the cost of punishing everyone else plus the utility bonus from punishment. If this condition
holds, a reciprocator will be (weakly) worse oﬀ switching from (0,0) to (1,1), assuming
that all others remain at (0,0). All other requirements for equilibrium are independent of
parameter values.
Next consider subgame-perfect equilibria of type B, in which opportunists do not con-
tribute and reciprocators contribute and punish opportunists. A necessary condition for such
equilibria to exist is




This ensures that the threat of punishment does not deter opportunists from defecting.
In addition, we require that reciprocators have an incentive to cooperate and punish. A
suﬃcient condition for this is the following, which guarantees that a reciprocator would not











This condition is not, however, necessary. Equilibria of type B can also arise if reciprocators
believe that switching to defection will result in punishment, and if this belief is warranted
2At such equilibria, if more than one person were to defect, then reciprocators will participate in punish-
ment only if this is consistent with utility maximization.
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The ﬁrst inequality ensures that all reciprocators who do not defect have an incentive to
punish the one reciprocator who does, provided that they all believe that every non-defecting
reciprocator will participate in punishment. The second ensures that a reciprocator will not







which ensures that a reciprocator will not free-ride on punishment (while continuing to
contribute). This is also implied by the ﬁrst inequality in (6). Hence (4), together with
either (5) or (6) are necessary and suﬃcient for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of type B to
exist.3
Finally consider equilibria of type C, in which all contribute and if one person were to
defect, reciprocators punish him. The conditions for such a subgame-perfect equilibrium to
exist are that k ≥ 2,











The ﬁrst of these ensures that no player would gain by switching to defection, while the
second ensures that in the event that a reciprocator were to defect, it will be in the interest
of the remaining reciprocators to punish him. The latter holds af o r t i o r iif an opportunist
were to defect.
We have so far neglected the case k = n. Here equilibria of types B and C are identical,
and will exist if and only if (7) and (8) hold. Except for the non-generic case of p =1−α/n,
equilibria of types B and C cannot coexist (except when k = n, making them identical). For
k<n ,when p>1 − α/n complete compliance with the norm of contribution is possible,
but when p<1 − α/n only partial compliance is possible.
These inequalities completely describe when each of the three types of equilibria will
exist. They exhaust all generic possibilities for subgame-perfect equilibria, since equilibria
must be intragroup symmetric. That is to say, in any equilibrium, since the incentives facing
3When k =1 , (5) is inconsistent with (3) for generic parameter values so these two types of equilibria
cannot coexist.
11a reciprocator are the same as that facing any other reciprocator, they must take the same
action at any stage of the game. This is, of course, true for opportunists as well.
3 Contingent Commitments
Since the model generally permits multiple equilibria, this raises the question of which equi-
librium we might expect to prevail in practice. We need to identify conditions under which
equilibria of type C will be chosen when these coexist with those of type A, and to perform
a similar analysis for the case when B and A coexist. We deal with the coexistence of C and
A ﬁrst.
It may be that (8) holds so that all contributing reciprocators will punish a lone defector,
but
b<γ (n − 1), (9)
so that a reciprocator will not punish if everyone else defects. The latter condition implies
(3) so an equilibrium of type A exists in this case. If, in addition, punishment is strong
enough to deter would-be defectors, that is if (7) holds, then equilibria of type C will exist
as well. Notice that the equilibrium payoﬀ to all players under C is α, which exceeds 1,t h e
payoﬀ from A. This raises the possibility that communication among players at the start
of each period can allow them to coordinate on the preferred equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we
shall consider commitments by reciprocators of the following kind: I will participate in the
punishment of defectors if enough other individuals also participate.
At the second (punishment) stage of the game, given that d people have defected, a





where e−1 is the number of other persons the reciprocator expects will punish. Suppose that
reciprocators who have contributed at the ﬁrst stage all believe that each one of them will
punish at the second stage, provided that it is optimal for them to do so conditional on this
belief. This assumes that reciprocators can coordinate their punishments. One may imagine
the reciprocators who have contributed gathering in the village square and assessing whether
o rn o tt h e r ea r ee n o u g ho ft h e mt oc a r r yo u tp u n i s h m e n ta ta na c c e p t a b l ec o s t .H e n c ei ft h e
inequality holds for some e ≤ n−d,w h e r ed denotes the number of individuals (opportunists
and reciprocators) who defected, then punishment will actually be carried out. This follows
if we assume that reciprocators can make commitments of the following kind: I will punish
12if at least e−1 others do so. In that case, choosing the smallest e that satisﬁes (10) weakly
dominates any other commitment. There is now an equilibrium in which all reciprocators
make such commitments at the start of each period, expect that the commitments will be
carried out by all contributing reciprocators, and all individuals (including opportunists)
contribute to the provision of the public good.
This alone does not solve the problem of equilibrium selection, since it is also an equi-
librium for all commitments to be ignored and for all players to defect. Such "babbling
equilibria" are not observed in everyday experience of coordination problems with pre-play
discussion. Experiments on coordination games with two or more players conﬁrm that cost-
less pre-play communication enables players to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equi-
librium (Russell, DeJong, Forsythe and Cooper, 1992; Burton, Loomes, and Sefton, 1999;
Blume and Ortmann, 2000; Charness, 2000) even when failure to coordinate involves a con-
siderable payoﬀ loss for those attempting to coordinat ea n de v e nt h o u g ht h ec o m m u n i c a t i o n
permitted in the experiments is extremely sparse. Babbling equilibria seem especially un-
likely if communication is at all costly, since in this case only players intending to honor
their commitments will bother to make them.4 For these reasons, we assume that players
will coordinate on the C-equilibrium when it exists.5
We are now ready to specify how play will evolve from one period to the next. At the
second stage of the game, the number of defectors of each type is known, and therefore, the
number of punishers, if any, is also determined. At the start of the ﬁrst stage, therefore, given
his expectation of which other players will contribute, a player’s choice of whether or not to
contribute is clear since he can compute the payoﬀ he will get in either case. As noted above,
we assume a simple form of bounded rationality, so that players have static expectations of
other players’ contribution decisions. They expect that the others will contribute as they
d i di nt h el a s tp e r i o d .
These assumptions are suﬃcient to fully specify how play will evolve from one period
to the next. It is immediate that it must converge to one of the subgame-perfect equilibria
4This method of equilibrium selection amounts to what has been called ‘forward induction’. See Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994) pp. 110-115 for a discussion and references to the originators of the concept. This
too has been conﬁrmed experimentally by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1993).
5A similar solution to the equilibrium selection problem could be used in a repeated-game model with
self-interested players in which each period has a punishment stage following the contribution stage. This
could be robust to noise. However, subgame-perfection of eﬃcient equilibria would require strategies that
involved an inﬁnite regress of punishments: players who did not punish would need to be punished, and so
on. We did not take this approach because it seems both less tractable and less empirically plausible than
the one adopted here.
13speciﬁed above. Now suppose it has converged on A although the parameters are such that
C is also an equilibrium. This means that A c a nb ee x p e c t e dt op r e v a i li nt h en e x tp e r i o d .
Therefore, players will soon realize that they are better oﬀ agreeing to play C at cost c if
c<α− 1. (11)
Therefore, if (11) holds then we cannot expect A to prevail in period after period. If we
observe a situation with no contributions, this must be either because the initial cost of
setting up the contribution mechanism was too high or because it was set up but subsequently
collapsed due to adverse parameter changes.
We can use (5) and similar reasoning to show that if the parameters are such that both A
and B-type equilibria exist, and if the cost of reciprocators communicating with each other
is positive but suﬃciently small, then we may expect to see only B-equilibria in the long
run.
It is worth remarking that this setup allows for noise in the sense that if players make
mistakes or experiment with new actions now and then, this will not generally result in a
change from C to A equilibria, unless there happen to be simultaneous mistakes by several
players. Moreover, if there is such a collapse of cooperation, cooperation may be recovered if
the communication cost is suﬃciently low. Thus, we would expect cooperation, (if it comes
into being) to be persistent, although perhaps subject to occasional random crashes.
4 Conditions for cooperation
The conditions for cooperation to take place in this set up are (7) and (8) together with
(11). What do they imply? First, for punishment to halt defections, the payoﬀ α/n that
each player expects to get from cooperating must be suﬃciently large that he does not ﬁnd
defection better. This means, of course, that not only must the return to cooperation be
high, but it must be known to be high by all concerned.
It also means that the punishment p has to be eﬀective. Eﬀective punishment will vary
from case to case, but the most likely punishment is exclusion from the commons. Whether
it is technologically and socially feasible may be critical. It will be weak if individuals expect
to leave the area soon, so short time horizons and a high probability of migration are not
conducive to cooperation. A dense network of social interaction may also favor punishment
as exclusion can then be used in the domain in which it is cheapest.
For punishment to be cheap to inﬂict it may be useful to have groups that are not
too small as is clear in (8). We do not know what the determinants of the proportion
14of reciprocators may be. However, it seems likely that b will depend on the return that
each reciprocator expects to get in equilibrium: if reciprocators have too small a stake in
the continuance of cooperation, they will not be suﬃciently emotionally involved to pursue
punishment. Finally, for the public good to be set up at all, the communication cost c has
to be suﬃciently low.
From the point of view of empirical testing, it is important to note that the conditions
for cooperation are given by inequalities. It follows that cooperation varies discontinuously
with the parameters. Changes in the parameters that are not large enough to reverse any of
the inequalities will have no eﬀect. This general point applies to the discussion in the next
section as well.
5 Heterogeneity and other generalizations
Consider as a benchmark the homogeneous player case in which (7) and (8) hold so that C
prevails. Now suppose that instead of punishment resulting in a uniform loss p,t h ee ﬀects
of punishment vary across players. The material payoﬀs (2) may now be written
πi(x,y)=
(
siα(X) − xi if e =0
siα(X) − xi − (1 − xi)pi − γyi
d
e. if e>0
where pi i st h ec o s tt op l a y e ri of being punished, and we are now allowing for a (possibly)
nonlinear production function α(X) which describes the output obtained as a function of
total contributions. As before, we ﬁxt h es h a r esi accruing to player i at 1/n.
Suppose for simplicity that there are just now two possible values of p,n a m e l ypl and
ph and that (7) holds for ph but not for pl <p h. Suppose pi = pl for nl players and kl
reciprocators and pi = ph for the remaining n − nl players and k − kl reciprocators. Those
players i with pi = pl a r el i t t l ea ﬀected by punishment and will ﬁnd it optimal to defect since




In the period following this, there may be too few reciprocators who have contributed to




k − kl − 1
¶
.
Furthermore, the free-riding of some players will lower the returns to the others, possibly
making it not worthwhile for them to contribute even if they were to be punished, that is,






j=1 xj denotes aggregate contributions by those players i with pi = ph. Notice
that this inequality is more likely to hold if the production function α(·) displays increasing
returns. Thus, heterogeneity in susceptibility to punishment, especially in combination with
increasing returns, may lead to collective action becoming infeasible.
The model so far ﬁxed both the shares of the public good accruing to each player, and
the contributions. However, if side payments are possible or contributions can be varied
continuously so that the distribution of the surplus α(X) − X from the public good may
be changed (within limits) without aﬀecting the total surplus, then it becomes easier to
achieve cooperation. This would be the case, for example, if the production function α(·)
were such that there exists a surplus-maximizing total contribution X∗ and players are not
wealth-constrained, meaning that there exists more than one vector of feasible contributions
that add up to X∗. In this case, the players may, after discussion and bargaining, agree
on a vector of contributions leading to a total contribution of X∗ and that ensures that the
necessary inequalities for successful collective action hold. A limited degree of heterogeneity
in one dimension, say of susceptibility to punishment, can be taken into account in the
division of the surplus by giving players with less susceptibility to punishment larger shares
of the surplus, while still leaving all players with a share of the surplus large enough to
motivate them to incur the cost of enforcement when necessary. We have discussed only
heterogeneity of power, but heterogeneity of other kinds, for example in the distribution of
returns si can be analyzed in a similar way. Heterogeneity, at least within limits, is not as
inimical to collective action as one might think.
Heterogeneity of power may actually favor collective action in some circumstances. To
see this, let us allow the punishments pi t od e p e n do nt h ee n t i r ev e c t o ry−i (so that the eﬀect
of punishment depends on the number and identity of the particular individuals who choose
to punish). Suppose the parameters are such that punishment is not an eﬀective deterrent
even when all individuals punish. That is, for all players i




Now suppose, instead, that there exists a group of powerful persons I,w h oc a ne ﬀectively
punish the others J (but not each other), if at least one of the others take part in enforcement,
say by monitoring defection. We need both the powerful and the weak for enforcement.
Otherwise, if the weak were not needed, the powerful would be able to coerce the weak and
leave them worse oﬀ. The powerful need to be given shares large enough that the private
returns to contribution for them are high enough to induce them to participate, even though
16they cannot be punished. Suppose that for all j ∈ J,
pj(y−j) > 1 − sjα
if at least one component yi of y−j is 1 for some i ∈ I, and at least one component yl of y−j
is 1 for some l ∈ J. Suppose also that the cost of punishment depends on the identity of
the punishers so that if at least one member from each group punishes, then the punishment
cost is less than b. Finally, suppose for all i ∈ I,
siα>1.
Now all the inequalities necessary for a Cequilibrium are in place provided the communication
cost c is suﬃciently low. For this to be a Pareto improvement over a situation with no
contributions it is necessary that sjα>1. Clearly there are many conﬁgurations of the
parameters such that these inequalities hold. However, if the weak did not have something
to oﬀer, for example, by way of help in monitoring, then it is unlikely that the powerful
would allocate a share to them that would make them better oﬀ than they would have been
under the unregulated outcome.
It is often observed that elites take the lead in the management of common property
resources and appropriate the lion’s share of the beneﬁts. As Baland and Platteau (1998)
point out, this is not always a Pareto-improvement over an unregulated outcome because
the poor may be worse oﬀ. Whether or not this actually occurs has to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We hope that the model presented here will prove useful as a framework for empirical research
into the issue of when collective action in the commons will be successful. It can be adapted
to particular situations by suitable modiﬁcation of the production function, punishment
technology, and so forth.
What policy implications can we draw from this theory? If outside intervention to help
spur collective action in the commons is to be successful, it has to ensure that enforcement
of contributions (or other non-defection) is both eﬀe c t i v ea n dc h e a p . L o w e r i n gt h ec o s to f
communication about such issues may be the role that outside agencies can play. They
may do so by helping participants see that collective action has been successful in similar
circumstances elsewhere, or simply by initiating and facilitating the process of discussion
17on the issue. They may need to provide information about the beneﬁts of collective action
in cases where this is not clear to the participants. Of course, this will only work if the
underlying conditions are favorable. This is less likely when players are transient so that
exclusion has little force, or when exclusion is not possible for some reason, or when there
is a set of powerful players who cannot be punished and whose private returns cannot be
made high enough to make it attractive for them to participate. Legal reforms that allow
for community enforcement or allows the state to lend force to community enforcement may
be called for in some cases. Care needs to be taken, of course, to see that this does not
result in an expropriation of the poor. Insisting that the process of legal change require the
consultation and consent of all groups would make this less likely.
We have not addressed several potentially important issues. What factors make it likely
that bargaining over the division of the surplus will end in agreement? How does asymmetric
information enter the picture? How does the history of cooperation over other issues aﬀect
people’s expectations about the likelihood of a stable agreement that will be enforced? How
does history aﬀect the proportion of reciprocators, or does it not? We leave these interesting
but challenging questions to future research.
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